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1 Mirativity
The concept of mirativity was introduced in typology by DeLancey (1997) for certain
”tenses”. DeLancey refers to earlier traditions in ”Balkan Linguistics”. Malchukov
(2003) uses it in a typological overview of constrastive markers for the origin of certain
contrastive markers. A mirative marker indicates that whatever it marks is surprising.
The fact that one can express surprise does not need a special explanation, but the
fact that one can do it with a range of grammaticalised expressions in a whole range of
languages does. The explanation has to make a connection with a tendency in interpre-
tation to go for the unsurprising. The same tendency is assumed in probabilistic disam-
biguation, where one tries to interpret the linguistic expression by giving it the meaning
that is most plausible in the context (this is just the most rational way to disambiguate, if
other resources do not lead to a unique reading). Another well known instance is to go
for stereotypical interpretations. That means that interpreters will avoid the surprising
unless told not to —which would be precisely the aim of the mirative marker. Mirativity
is useful because it protects surprising content from correction by interpreters.
In English, one can find the markers even, still, already and only that seem to be
mirative (another group of mirative devices are the adversative markers: these are not
discussed here). In all four cases, they are specialised mirative markers, they express
surprise at the large size of a quantity (even), surprise at the small size of a quantity
(only), surprise at the early time of some event or the advent of some state (already) or
at the long continuation of a state (still). Surprise would be a question of conflict with
an expectation. Together this gives the following table:
even: more than expected
only: less than expected
already: earlier than expected
still: later than expected
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It is relatively simple to state the semantics of the four particles informally in a uniform
way.
(1) Bill is still in Paris
(1) states or reconfirms that Bill is in Paris at the moment of speaking and presupposes
that he was expected to have left from there before the moment of speaking. The point
of the utterance is to assert that the presupposed expectation is false.
(2) Bill is already in Paris
(2) states that Bill is in Paris but presupposes him being elsewhere with the intention
of going to Paris and the expectation that he would not be in Paris yet. The point of the
utterance is to assert that the presupposed expectation is false.
(3) Even Bill is in Paris
The sentence states that Bill is in Paris and presupposes an expectation that others but
not Bill would be in Paris. The sentence asserts that the presupposed expectation is false.
(4) Only Bill is in Paris
(4) states that it is Bill who is in Paris and presupposes an expectation that ”more than
just Bill” would be in Paris. It asserts that the presupposed expectation is false. This is a
simple approximation to the semantics of the mirative particles if they are the outermost
operator in an assertion and the point of the utterance is to express the surprise. In the
case of ”still”, ”already” and ”even”, the host itself states new information, expected to
be false. Only is special because the information stated by the host is expected to be the
case: the expectation was ”Bill and more”, and this includes Bill.
The semantics of mirativity seems straightforward and can be isolated from the
other aspects: a presupposed expectation is asserted to be false. It is tempting to think
of the mirative markers as correction markers. And not entirely wrong because they can
be used in this role.
(5) A. Bill must be back home.
B. No, he is still in Paris.
A. [At a meeting in London.] Where is Bill?
B. He is already in Paris.
A. [Idem] Bill must be here.
B. Even Bill is in Paris.
A. The whole sales team is in Paris.
B. Only Bill is.
But —as it turns out— the expectation can be much weaker than the belief of the inter-
locutor (or the common ground, or a second speaker) and can even be vanishingly weak:
a mere suggestion or what somebody might think. Especially in subordinate occurrences
of only, the expectation can almost disappear.
Examples like (6) should therefore not be taken too seriously as counterexamples
to a mirative analysis. It seems enough that the alternative to the presupposed expectation
of the speaker or everybody is also under consideration in the context.
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(6) [I/everybody expect only John to come.]
If only John comes, we will have enough to eat, but if he
brings his son...
The weakening of presupposition in particles is a general phenomenon and can be related
to the ”semantic weakening” and ”pragmaticisation” that is attendant on grammaticali-
sation. In the case of mirative particles, Fong (2003) reports that ”already” in Singapore
can function as a perfective marker (without mirativity) and O¨sten Dahl (1985) takes
it that there is a general tendency of the already-type particles to become perfective
markers. Fong describes the process by which ”already” can mark perfectivity as a case
of semantic epenthesis: ”already” normally marks two semantic features: surprise and
perfectivity. In the perfective uses, surprise is still marked by ”already” but it does not
become part of the final interpretation that the hearer reaches and was never a part of the
interpretation that the speaker intended the hearer to reach.
While this is an interesting way to look at what is going on here, there is another
avenue: weak presupposition. The presupposed expectation can be common ground (be-
fore the speaker had the new information), they can be the speaker’s or the hearer’s, but
they can also be the expectation of a third party or of a possible third party. The weakest
expectation is ”there might be somebody who might think that A”. The presupposition
resolution mechanism tries to find the weak presupposition in the common ground and
in the opinions of highly activated persons, but also allows suggestions and attitudes by
other people as antecedent and can in the last resort just assume that the weak presuppo-
sition is somehow thinkable.
The outcome of presupposition weakening and semantic epenthesis is nearly
the same. The weakening approach finds confirmation in what one finds as ”presup-
position” in the weaker versions of ”wel” or ”doch”: in the strong versions they are
correction particles, in the weaker versions, the presupposed proposition that they con-
firm is merely suggested or even completely absent Hogeweg (2005), Zeevat (2004),
Karagjosova (2003). In fact, the strength of the presupposition antecedent is the key fac-
tor in keeping the different meanings of these particles apart in a context (and the factor
that determines the intonation, the other clue for disambiguation: overt antecedents lead
to contrastive intonation).
It is well-known that ”even”-type particles are a source for the non-mirative ad-
ditive particles (Malchukov (2003)). One may speculate that ”still” may be a source
for progressive marking. Only has a tendency to turn into an adversative particle, as in
Dutch or English and in Hungarian1..
(7) Peter is erg aardig. Je moet alleen oppassen als hij gedronken
heeft.
Peter is very nice. But/Only you must take care if he has
been drinking.
There is an almost universal agreement that only means ”to the exclusion of others”.
Barwise and Cooper (1981), Rooth (1992), van Rooy and Schulz (2005), Horn (1969),
Ippolito (2006).
1Gyuris, unfortunately only published in Hungarian
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(8) Only Bill is in Paris
Nobody but Bill is in Paris.
The discussion is then about what to do with the ”prejacent”, the host of only. For
some, it is asserted, others defend that it is presupposed, or that its topic ”x is Paris”
is existentially presupposed. Ippolito even lets the presupposition be ”If somebody is
in Paris, Bill is”. van Rooy and Schulz (2005) makes the prejacent an implicature. A
healthy exception is Atlas Atlas (1993).
Zeevat (2007) notes the following puzzle about only. In Rooth (1992) , an as-
sertion like ”John likes SUSAN”, with focus on ”Susan” turns out to mean the same as
”John likes only SUSAN”. But, intuitively, the meaning is not the same. My conclusion
in 1994 was that only meant ”less than expected” or that related to widening of the do-
main, but I did not see my way to a full treatment of only based on that view2. The same
puzzle arises in question-answer pairs.
(9) A. Who showed up?
B. Only John.
B is already expected to give an exhaustive answer to the question. The addition of only
would then be superfluous. The mirative view makes it easy to understand: more people
were expected to show up and only John came.
Umbach (2005) has a similar and beautiful example (10) for this phenomenon.
(10) (Things have changed in the Miller family.)
a. Yesterday, RONALD went shopping.
b. Yesterday, only RONALD went shopping.
In (10a) , Ronald went instead of Susan (he would not normally come along), whereas
in (10b) , one understands that he normally goes with Susan. In both cases, Ronald
goes alone. If only just meant exhaustivity, the contrast cannot be explained. We arrive
at the different interpretations by constructing the expectation that is violated in (10b) :
Ronald always goes shopping with Susan. In (12a) it is not necessary to construct an
expectation that a larger group than just Ronald goes shopping. In fact, it is difficult to
get a reading where ”Ronald” contrasts with ”Ronald and Susan”, presumably because
only is required for expressing that reading.
I want to defend the following four theses in this paper.
1. The semantic contribution of only is only low quantity mirativity: less than ex-
pected.
2. Other aspects —in particular exhaustivity— are an effect of ”focus”: the host has
to be interpreted as the exhaustive answer to its topic question.
2Mymain reason for taking this up again was reading part of an earlier manuscript of Beaver and Clark
(2008). The position of this paper is close to the final version but different in not attributing exclusivity
to the semantics of only, but to the exhaustive interpretation of the host forced by only. The proposed
“semantics” of mirativity and the treatment of only if are new elements. I would claim that the treatment
provided here makes it easier to see the relation with the other mirative particles and to deal with the
grammaticalisation of only.
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3. Only forces the host to have that interpretation.
4. Except for (2) and (3) an only-sentence means the conjunction of only and its host.
(4) would be the ideal for particle semantics and seems viable for most particles with
negation particles and floating quantifiers the exception. The host means whatever it
means, the particle adds something.
(1) denies the received view: only does not mean ”to the exclusion of others”.
That only-sentences entail exhaustivity is the effect of disambiguation: the interpreta-
tion as the exhaustive answer to the question coresponding to its topic (2) is a possible
meaning of the host, forced by the presence of only (3). Only itself has a different task,
denying an expectation.
Section 2 develops the meaning of only, section 3 discusses weak presupposition
as an analysis of expectation, section 5 applies these ideas to the logic of only if and the
conclusion contains a brief discussion of ”association with focus” and the other mirative
particles.
2 The Meaning of ”Only”
The first point to be made has to do with quantity mirativity. If only occurs in a host,
it can only express quantity mirativity if the host specifies a quantity. This forces an
interpretation on the host that turns it into an exhaustive answer to a quantity question.
It is clear what the question is: it is obtained by leaving out the focused element from
the host and replacing it by a suitable wh-element. Schematically the host is then H(C)
withC the focused element. The question is then ?xH(x) and its exhaustive answer isC.
The second point to be made is that surprise at a low quantity presupposes the
expectation of a higher quantity: somebody must expect the exhaustive answer to ?xH(x)
to be ”C together with other persons or things”.
This can be provisionally notated as exp(H(C+O)). An only-sentence then con-
firms the expectation that C belongs to the answer and denies that O is part of it. Only
therefore presupposes exp(H(C+O). It asserts that anything below O lacks the property
H: ∀x⊆ O¬H(x).
Let’s apply this to the Umbach example (11):
(11) Yesterday, only Ronald went shopping.
The presupposed expectation is that, last Saturday, others O would have gone shopping
with Ronald. Given the setting, O must resolve to the singleton {s} consisting just of
Ronald’s wife Susan. This gives the representation (12) (I will write the presupposition
before ”:” and the assertion after it.).
(12) exp(S(r+ s)) : ¬S(s)
The utterance implicates that Ronald is the single person from the Miller family
who went shopping yesterday—that part of the expectation is not denied. It is properly
denied that Susan went shopping with Ronald. The denial involves a correction of the
expectation: Susan was expected to go, but didn’t.
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If the utterance is denied as in (13) the nature of the expectation changes. The
information that the utterance illustrates how the Miller family habits changed makes
it impossible to assume that Susan and Ronald had a habit of shopping together on
Saturdays. It seems that a sociological fact of couples normally doing the shopping
together on Saturdays will now have to underpin the expectation.
(13) Last Saturday not only Ronald did the shopping.
exp(S(r+ s)) : ¬¬S(s)
The result of the negation is that the expectation is implicated to be true: the Miller
couple did the shopping together last Saturday, since this is the evoked and uncorrected
expectation. There is another expectation involved here: the expectation that Ronald
would be shopping alone, presumably based on an opposite habit. This expectation is
evoked by the negation: without that expectation, there is no reason for denying that
Susan did not go.
While this is an approximation and explains the intuitions about who it is that
accompanies Ronald in (13) , it is too weak. Both the positive and the negative example
seem to entail that Ronald went shopping, whether by himself or in company and not
just to implicate it. Also the analysis fails to exclude a situation where a relevant other
person, different from the expected Susan went along shopping with Ronald, e.g. his
mother in law. And this is intuitively ruled out in the positive case.
The problem is that we only dealt with only, treating the host sentence merely
as a convenient source for semantic material to slot into the semantics of only. This
semantics can be given abstractly as: only α(c) presupposes an x that is expected to have
the property α together with the disjoint c3 and denies α of x.
(14) x,exp(α(c+ x) : ¬α(x)
What does the host sentence contribute? The use of only does not make sense on a host
α(c) unless α(c) is interpreted as determining the ”quantity” c as the exhaustive answer
to the question ”wh- among the C has the property α?”. If α(c) merely gave a non-
exhaustive answer to that question without a further claim that that is the full answer,
no quantity mirativity could sensibly attach to it. If c is merely one of the true answers
to the question, c could not be less than expected, since the other answers are unknown
and maybe add up to the expected quantity. An exhaustive answer can be seen as a
non-exhaustive answer together with the statement that other answers, disjoint from c or
exceeding c are false. This can be written as follows.
(15) : α(c),∀x(x 6⊆ c→¬α(x))
The two semantic representations can be combined into (16).
(16) x,exp(α(c+ x)) : ¬α(x),α(c),∀x(x 6⊆ c→¬α(x))
3Here and elsewhere, x+ y is used for a sum of disjoint entities. This is not a restriction: if x and y are
not disjoint, one can take y\ x instead of y.
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Now a simplification is possible. ¬(α(x)) is a consequence of ∀x(x 6⊆ c→¬α(x)) and
so it can be dropped.
But also the status of α(c) changes, since it is part of the expectation. This leads
to another simplification which however needs a closer look at expectation.
The operator ”expected” is only correct for the positive Umbach example, where
the expectation based on our take of the habits of the Millers is a full-fledged member
of the common ground. But already in the negative example the expectation is much
weaker. Do we really expect that couples do the shopping together on Saturday? This
is just a tendency and far too weak to put any money on Susan and Ronald going to-
gether especially when they have a habit of not doing so. The expectation is much better
analysed as weak presupposition, needed anyway in the analysis of many particles. In
the examples, weakly presupposed shopping by Ronald and Susan could pick up both
a habit of the Millers of shopping together or the general habit of couples shopping to-
gether on Saturday. These problems are better addressed by weak presupposition: the
common ground should contain a reason for thinking that p is true given, where p is the
expectation. There may be reasons for thinking both that p and that ¬p, and there may
be a reason for thinking that p even if there is more reason for thinking that ¬p. Weak
presupposition in addition seems to be independently required for the meanings of other
particles, for negation, for questions and for intonation.
3 Weak Presupposition
Weak presupposition has been around for a long time, especially in areas like negation
and questions. What makes it weak is that the weakly presupposed material does not
need to hold in the common ground or in the common ground extended with local infor-
mation such as normal, strong presupposition requires. The weak presupposition may
be in the common ground as such, but it can equally well be in the common ground as
a suggestion, as an opinion of somebody or merely as a plausible inference. The claim
is that negation weakly presupposes the opposite opinion in the context (which then
gets denied) and that wh-questions weakly presuppose the truth of the corresponding
existential statement (which is enough for making it plausible that it can be answered).
Some maintain that the difference between positive and negative polar questions can be
explained by weak presupposition: positive polar questions weakly presuppose the neg-
ative answer and negative polar questions weakly presuppose the positive answer. Weak
presupposition is not important for the formal semantics of questions and negation, but
from the perspective of discourse and dialogue coherence, it is hard to overrate it. The
weak presupposition that finds a proper antecedent for a question or negation will give
vital clues about why the question arose and how it should be interpreted and related to
the speaker’s intentions or to what exactly it is that the interlocutor is denying.
In the area of particle semantics, weak presupposition seems to be even more
unavoidable. A correction marker requires a statement to be corrected, an adversative
marker, something that is ”adverse” to it, an additive marker something that it is in
addition too, a confirmation marker something that it confirms. And quite systematically
one finds that the corrected statement does not need to be entailed in the local context
128 Henk Zeevat
of the marker (one can correct Harry’s beliefs just as well as the interlocutor’s or one’s
own), that the adverse information is not directly given but must be inferred by plausible
inference, that additive antecedents are embedded under operators like perhaps or even
Bill dreamt that and that confirmation markers can confirm information that is given
under a similarly wide range of operators .
Not that anything goes. Negative contexts (like negation and doubt) do not pro-
vide good antecedents (but their negations may be picked up). Also proper contexts for
antecedents can be blocked by denying the truth of the antecedent or casting doubt on it.
(17) Mary doubted that she would pass. ??She did indeed./She
failed indeed.
John thinks that Mary is in Spain. Bill is in Spain too.
John thinks that Mary is in Spain, which cannot be
true/which I doubt ??Bill is in Spain too.
The conditions on what is a good antecedent are also not uniform for the different mark-
ers.
(18) Bill dreamt that Mary was in Spain. She is indeed.
Bill dreamt that Mary was in Spain. ?Susan is there too.
Bill dreamt that Mary was in Spain in June. ??She is there
again.
One can try to develop a single operator that generalises over all possible operators
(see Zeevat (2004) for an attempt) but in the light of the different acceptability of the
examples in (18) this seems misguided and at best only partly correct. There is also a
default when different resolutions are possible: one needs to go for the ”most accessible”
one and this default is obscured by having a single operator that lumps all the possibilities
together.
Another problem with such an account can be illustrated by the following pair.
(19) Hij komt WEL.
Hij komt wel.
The first example needs a proper antecedent with an overt negation and is a correction of
the opinion expressed by the negated sentence (it can be the correction of the belief of a
person different from speaker or hearer):
(20) Piet denkt dat Jan niet komt.
Hij komt WEL.
The second example means something like, Don’t worry. In my opinion, he will come.
This is similar to WEL in presupposing the negation of the host, but this time it can
be an unexpressed thought which is attributed to the audience. The way in which the
antecedent is given seems to be decisive for the ambiguity between a proper correction,
based on what the speaker believes to know and the much weaker disagreement with the
negation expressed in the other case.
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It would seem that the different degree of toleration for weak antecedents can be
much better understood as the outcome of a natural historical process4 in which proper
lexical presupposition triggers lose descriptive meaning in favour of a linking and dis-
tinguishing function, acquire more toleration for inaccessible antecedents and lose their
ability to force accommodation.
The property of non-accommodation (also here a question of degree) is the third
property that sets weak presupposition apart from strong presupposition. If weak presup-
position cannot be resolved to the discourse context, as a last resort they can be assumed
to hold under an operator like it might be thought that. This would deal with the cases of
negations and questions where no antecedents seem to be around or with the ”extremely
grammaticalised” uses of particles like wel.
The three properties of weak presupposition are connected. Little lexical content
means that the presupposition will not end up in a predication that must be true in the
local context of the trigger, which allows it to have antecedents that do not need to exist
or be the case in that local context. Linking and distinguishing to discourse elements
that one first has to accommodate does not seem useful, quite apart from the fact that
signaling that the discourse context has certain components when it does not, sits badly
with the intuition that the discourse context has common ground status.
The notion of weak presupposition can be implemented by a variant of the pro-
posal of van der Sandt (1992) for strong presupposition. The weak presupposition is
provisionally represented at the site of the trigger. The accessible contexts are then
searched in the normal order, with two additional options. The first is a recursive search
in the content of their subordinate contexts which are introduced by positive attitude and
modal operators. The second option is inference: does the context offer a reason r for
thinking that p. This comes down to searching with a search term [r,normallyi f r, p] and
requires an axiomatisation of ”normally if”. Instead of failing or normal accommodation
when the antecedent cannot be found, the most tolerant class of weak triggers can just
add the always uncontroversial: it might be thought that p to the outermost context, as a
last resort.
The most tolerant class of weak triggers —to which only belongs— is constituted
by questions, negations and confirmation and correction markers. Additive markers are
more restricted in the range of operators under whose content can be searched and do not
allow the last resort reading. Adversative markers seem similarly restricted. This is not
say that these classes of particles are homogeneous. This paper is however not a place
to engage in a proper study of the fine structure involved.
The application to only is to replace the notion of expectation by weak presuppo-
sition of the kind that can take antecedents from any kind of positive context and from
inferential processes and as a last resort can add ”it might be thought that p”. In this, it
would be comparable to wh-questions, negation or to particles like indeed.
This makes the meaning of only into (21).
4A much more systematic argument for differentiation by a historical process can be developed here
by comparing the distribution of classes of particles. For example, only, but, just, merely are all exclu-
sive particles and exclusively is an adverb with exclusive meaning, but they vary substantially in their
distribution. As another example, the Russian particles i, tozhe and takzhe are all three additive but have
completely different syntactic and semantic properties.
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(21) x,weak(α(c+ x)) : ¬α(x)
And the meaning of the combination of only and its host α(c) into (22).
(22) x,weak(α(c+ y)) : α(c),∀x(x 6⊆ c→¬α(x))
I.e. α(c) is both weakly presupposed and asserted. This is a strange status: as an assertion
α(c) should be new, as a weak presupposition, it is given. Assertions that are not new
are normally marked by confirmation markers such as indeed, unaccented doch and the
like. It seems natural to claim only is a confirmation marker with respect to prejacent.
A technical proposal to deal with material that is both weakly presupposed and
asserted is to make it both strongly and weakly presupposed. The weak presupposition
forces a search for the material and if it turns out to be present in the accessibility path of
the trigger, this is the antecedent for both the weak and the strong presupposition. If the
search for weak antecedents however leads to a weak antecedent, the accommodation
attendant on strong presupposition will add the material to a context on the accessibility
path of the trigger, nl. at the point of the operator on the weak antecedent.
This comes down to the statement that α(c) is either resolved to an accessible an-
tecedent, or resolved to an inaccessible antecedent with a further accommodation in an
accessible context. The further accommodation in case the resolution is to an inaccessi-
ble attitude or suggestion is a confirmation of that attitude or suggestion. In neither case,
it can be new focal material of the only-sentence that can be in the scope of a negation.
The technical proposal is presumably the correct analysis of confirmation mark-
ing. (23) is correct in identifying the assertion with the weak presupposition, but it would
correspond to an instruction to identify p in the context (including the non-accessible
parts under a positive operator) followed by an update with p. But if p is found in the
accessibility path of indeed, this would lead to a spurious update with p, i.e. garbage
with the potential of generating confusion.
(23) indeed(p)
weak(p) : p
So the correct view is as in (24) which avoids spurious updates. The ideal for particle
semantics is to see indeed(p) as the conjunction of the assertion that p and the fact that p
is given. But this is self-defeating: proper assertions are supposed to assert new material.
Marking p as a given presupposition solves the problem.
(24) weak(p), p :
The conclusion is that question whether the host in an only-sentence is a presupposition,
an assertion or an implicature is a false trilemma. It cannot be a proper assertion since it
is marked as given: it is however confirmed. It cannot be a proper presupposition since
it can be tied to inaccessible material outside the common ground, it is however a weak
presupposition. It cannot be an normal implicature since it cannot be cancelled. The
status of a given presupposition seems the way out.
The proposal hardwires the impossibility of negation as in (25) taking scope over
the statement ”Ronald did the shopping”: it is given and presupposed. But even if that
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statement is thought of as part of the assertion, the assertion would be improper, since
it is a partial confirmation of the weakly presupposed statement that Ronald and others
went shopping. The antecedent of the weak presupposition is not in the scope of the
negation.
(25) It is not the case that only Ronald went shopping.
Not only Ronald did the shopping.
The proposal makes the representation of only-sentences still simpler, as in (26).
(26) α(c),weak(x,α(c+ x)) : ∀x(x 6⊆ c→¬α(x))
Notice that this version deals with the problems noted above. Ronald’s shopping be-
comes entailed by any successful interpretation of the positive and negative case, Ronald’s
mother in law is excluded from accompanying him in the positive case and weak pre-
supposition allows Susan’s presence to be more unexpected than expected in the negated
case.
One can continue to be unhappy about the negated case. In the Umbach example,
the result of pure mirativity was that the expected Susan was indeed asserted to be the
person who was with Ronald when he did the shopping. The combined version merely
entails that Ronald went shopping with someone other than himself. This is perhaps
right, with it being an implicature that it was Susan due to the setting: the sentence gives
an explanation of a change in the Miller household and this points towards Susan.
Compare (27)on this point. Speaker A has noticed that John did not take the
danish rolls at an occasion he was offered bagels and danish rolls. Speaker B knows
better: he also eats chocolate croissants. B has not entailed that John eats danish rolls
when he finishes the first part of his correction.
(27) A: John only eats bagels.
B. No, John does not only eat bagels. He also eats chocolate
croissants.
It has been noticed in the literature (Horn (1969)) that one can fairly felicitously correct
on the prejacent in the positive case, but that this becomes almost inacceptable in the
negative case.
(28) Only Ronald did the shopping but I am not sure that he did
indeed go.
(??) Not only Ronald did the shopping, but I am not sure that
Ronald did indeed do the shopping.
The asymmetry can be connected to the analysis. Somebody who makes the positive
statement exploits the weak presupposition and makes the exhaustive assertion of the
host that goes with it. He can then correct himself on the point of Ronald really doing
the shopping. This is quite comparable to saying (29), using the strategy of saying
something stronger and then taking back some of it: nobody else went shopping and
perhaps not even Ronald.
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(29) Everybody came. Except John.
In the negative case, the weak presupposition is not denied but confirmed. So here the
speaker would come out as both affirming and denying the weak presupposition and
it would not be an instance of the strategy of overstating and taking back some of it
employed in the last example. Moreover, it seems unfortunate to first focus on the others
(taking Ronald for granted) and then coming back to Ronald and to express one’s doubts.
Finally, the real challenge for those who want to maintain that the host is pre-
supposed is to explain why it cannot be cancelled under negation, as is predicted to be
possible under almost any view of presupposition. Presuppositions under negation can
be easily cancelled as shown by examples like (30).
(30) The king of France is not bald. There is no king of France.
What your generalisation captures is exactly nothing.
But (31) is completely out.
(31) ????Not only Ronald did the shopping. He never went near
a shop.
????It is not the case that only Ronald did the shopping. He
never went near a shop.
An explanation of this impossibility should show that local accommodation in the scope
of the negation is not possible for the non-exhaustive version of ”Ronald did the shop-
ping”. In the view of Van der Sandt, cancellation under negation is local accommodation
under the negation. For ”Ronald did the shopping” there are two possibilities. Either it
resolves to the same antecedent as the weak presupposition ”Ronald and others did the
shopping”. In that case, it cannot be locally accommodated under the negation. The
other possibility is that ”Ronald and others did the shopping” finds a weak antecedent
in a context originating from an accessible context C of only. In that case, the proper
accommodation site for ”Ronald did the shopping” is C, again well outside the local
context of the negation. In this perspective, the fact that the weak presupposition of only
entails the prejacent is responsible for the absence of accommodation of the prejacent
under negation.
4 Context-sensitivity of ”Only”
Low quantity mirativity is a label that hides considerable complexities. To be surprised
at a low quantity one needs: a set of quantities for comparison, an ordering over them
and an orientation. Before a quantity was a set in a set of sets ordered by inclusion and
the orientation was from small to large.
But quantities can be objects, weights, chunks of matter, sizes, numbers, profes-
sions, propositions and other things, with an order and orientation derived from the topic
question, the goal behind it and the elements themselves.
(32) is ambiguous5 as can be seen by the utterances it may correct.
5Notice that this example is fine in English but translates badly into Dutch or German.
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(33) Seven boys can lift this piano./20 boys can lift this piano.
No, only 12 boys can lift the piano.
If one corrects on ”seven boys”, the question is ”how many boys can lift this piano” and
one denies that the answer ”seven boys” is correct. The true answers form an interval
[n,ω] of the natural numbers. The smaller cardinalities 1 . . .11 are denied by the exhaus-
tive interpretation. When ”20 boys” is corrected, the question must be different: if 7 or
12 boys will do, also 20 boys will do. The question in this setting is ”what is the least
number of boys that can lift the piano”. The set of numbers that give a true answer is
now just {n} and the contribution of only is limited to the negation of the expectation
that is normally —but not here— entailed by the exhaustive interpretation.
The following examples show that the ordering for the interpretation can derive
from non-logical and non-mathematical factors.
(34) Only Bill is in Paris.
Assume Bill is there on a business trip, Bill is the best salesman in the company, but his
boss the best negotiator and Bill is there for important negotiations. The issue addressed
is whether there is a good negotation team and only Bill is less good than could be
expected. If one changes the setting to a sales visit and the issue to whether the company
has sent the right team, the use of (34) will become inappropriate.
What seem to be going on here is some mapping from the possible answers to
the quality of the team for the job they are supposed to do. Adding the boss to the
negotiation team would make it better. Adding the boss to the sales team would not
make much difference.
One way of thinking about cases like this would be as another question hiding be-
hind the official question ”who is in Paris?”. Something like: ”how good is our company
team in Paris for the negotiations?” This is the question resolution mechanism discussed
by Ginzburg (1995).
Something similar is going on in the following example. Suppose A has organ-
ised a voluntary question hour before the test for his course. He now reports (35).
(35) Only John showed up.
He may in fact be disappointed about the number of students who showed up without the
fact that John was the exception having any special role in his expectations. He expected
5 students to show up. John is just a special way of answering the question with one.
Mechanisms of question resolution and domain restriction as part of question
resolution have an important part to play. The structure of the set of possible answers
to the question determines the meaning of exhaustivity (the denial of the answers not
entailed by the host) and so influences the meaning of an only-sentence. In the mirative
theory of only this part of the account of only-sentences is not related to only as such: it
belongs to the explanation of scalar implicatures and other exhaustivity effects.
(32) A. 20 boys can lift the piano.
B. ?Slechts/alleen/maar 12 jongens kunnen de piano optillen.
B. ? Nur 12 Jungen koennen das Klavier aufheben.
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5 Only if
The assumption that the semantic function of only is to express low quantity mirativity
on top of the semantics of the host runs into trouble with a famous use of only in logic:
the only if ... then-connective normally claimed to mean to reverse of the connective if
then.
(36) if p then q: p→ q
only if p then q: q→ p
It is directly clear that this should be an exception to the view on only developed in this
paper and to all other views that hold that the host is entailed, presupposed, implicated
or otherwise true if the only-sentence is. The logical view makes things easy: q→ p just
does not entail p→ q, so the only-sentence can be true without the host being true.
One may perhaps think for a brief moment that this is an artefact of the logical
tradition: one has been trained to understand it the logician’s way. But this is not plausi-
ble, since there are similar ways of connecting material that have the same property and
that play no role in logic.
(37) John visits Mary on Sundays.
In Paris, John drinks wine.
When it rains, John takes an umbrella.
The most accessible interpretations of these sentences is as a soft universal quantifica-
tion: this is what John does on a Sunday, this is what he takes for his drink in Paris (at
his meals perhaps), this is what he does when it rains. Compare these with the following
cases.
(38) John visits Mary only on Sundays.
Only in Paris, John drinks wine.
Only when it rains, John takes an umbrella.
Here clearly, the soft universal reading is not present. John may visit Mary only very
rarely on a Sunday. It may have been a single time during many long visits to Paris that
John took some wine and the occasions on which it rained and John took an umbrella
may be few in comparison with the cases in which he went into the rain without one. So
from a linguistic perspective, the problem of only if arises at other places and it cannot
be an artefact of logic, in which sentences such as these are rarely discussed.
These other cases turn out to give the key to the solution to the problem with
only if: it is possible to set up the context so that the universal quantification becomes an
existential one, as in (39).
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(39) A. John never visits Mary on a Sunday.
B. Well, he does visit Mary on Sundays. Only not very often.
A. John never drinks wine in Paris.
B. Well, he does drink wine in Paris. But he also has beer
when he is there.
A. John never takes an umbrella.
B. Well, when it rains, John takes an umbrella. But not
always.
And another way (40) of forcing these interpretations.
(40) A. When does John visit Mary?
B. He visits Mary on Sundays. Only not very often.
A. When does John drink wine?
B. He drinks wine in Paris. But he also has beer when he is
there.
A. When does John take an umbrella?
B. When it rains, John takes an umbrella. But not always.
And this is precisely what is needed. The view on only in this paper was given as follows.
1. The semantic contribution of only is only low quantity mirativity: less than ex-
pected.
2. Other aspects —in particular exhaustivity— are an effect of ”focus”: the host has
to be interpreted as the exhaustive answer to its topic question.
3. Only forces the host to have that interpretation.
According to (3), only forces an exhaustive interpretation on these examples as
in (38) as an answer to a question as in (40) . The pattern is the same when one uses
the corresponding if . . . then-sentences.
(41) John visits Mary, if it is Sunday.
John drinks wine, if he is Paris.
If it rains, John takes an umbrella.
Applying this to a well-known example (42), it gives three things.
(42) Only if you behave, you will get a cookie.
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The first is an expectation that indifferent as well as proper behaviour will lead to a
cookie. The expectation is quite likely founded in the behaviour of the adressee. The
expectation is denied.
”if you behave” should be an exhaustive answer to the topic question, here:
”when will you get a cookie?”. It is not completely obvious what exhaustivity means
in this context but this may be safely left for future research6.
But property (3) is really the important one. It forces an interpretation on only
if-sentences where the host is an exhaustive answer to the question ”when does the con-
sequent hold”. And this gives—as shown above— an existential reading: there are cases
in which the condition and the consequent both hold.
Applied to our example, it is clear that it does not amount to a promise. But there
is hope: some lines of proper conduct will lead to a cookie.
Normal if...then sentences are universal, just like the examples in (39) . They
typically answer questions of the form (43).
(43) What happens, if ....
What follows, if ....
And the causal and logical order are such that this assigns universal force. If the answer
is based on causality or logic, it will invariably (or ceteris paribus) follow from the
antecedent.
Unfortunately, in the case of (42) it does not suffice to add an earlier never-
sentence or to make a when-question explicit to get the host to have this reading. B’s
contribution cannot —or only with the greatest difficulty— be interpreted existentially,
i.e. without given it the force of an a conditional promise.
(44) A. When will I get a cookie?
B. If you behave, you will get a cookie.
A. So I will not get a cookie under any circumstance?
B. If you behave, you will get a cookie.
In fact, this prompted Saeboe (1986) to the conclusion that the host of only if-sentences
must contain a hidden can. I prefer a different formulation of this insight: can must be
inserted when only is removed since just removing only makes the existential reading
non accessible. The can is not a hidden operator, but an (obligatory) marker of the
(modal) existential interpretation of the conditional (a disambiguating device).
There are two kinds of if . . . then-sentences: one where the condition describes
many (possible) events and one in which the condition describes a single possible event.
The existential reading is different in both cases: with many events, the conditional
states that some of these events are accompanied by the consequent, with the singular
event that it may be accompanied by the consequent. For a condition of many events, the
existential reading can be forced by inserting sometimes (an optional marker). Only also
forces this reading. But there are quite a number of contexts (bare plural, bare singulars,
6The intuitive generalisation of the semantics given earlier on is not bad however: the possible lines of
conduct which are not special cases of ”behave” do not have the property that a cookie will be awarded at
the end of them. But this lacks logical sophistication.
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unanchored past, omitted arguments etc.) in which an existential interpretation does
not need to be overtly marked and it is unsurprising to find another cases of the same
phenomenon, i.e. the case that the conditional is the answer to a when-question or the
case that it denies a never-statement. The existential reading on conditionals in which
the condition describes a single event can be forced by modals like can or by only. But
the possibility interpretation cannot remain unmarked, since it is not the default: that
is the statement that the consequent will happen or hold when the condition happens or
holds. So what happens in a singular event conditional hosting only is that when only is
removed, it reverts to the non-existential default interpretation.
The counterargument to the view of this paper based on only if turns out on a
closer look to be more an argument in its favour. The disambiguation of the host by
the presence of only is even more spectacular than in the case of if . . . then-sentences
than in the case of simple sentences like ”only Ronald did the shopping”. This reading
of ”if”-sentences has been noticed before by Saeboe (1986) and Kratzer (1979). The
latter discusses the case that the i f -clause associates with an adverbial like sometimes,
and this gives the same reading. The presence of an existential adverbial is however not
necessary for the reading, as I hope to have shown.
6 Conclusion
The considerations above make it possible to avoid association with focus, even in the
minimal sense of Rooth (1992). Only expresses that an exhaustive answers to a wh-
question falls short of the expectation. The meaning can be characterised in terms of
that question and its answer. Since the host normally has the intonation of such an
answer, stress is on the element that corresponds with the wh-phrase.
The easiest way to deal with the combination of the semantics of only and its
host is by means of anaphora. Only would presuppose the semantics of the host as an
exhaustive answer to a wh-question and would pick up both the question and its answer
as antecedents, with the additional requirement that if the occurrence is non-elliptical,
the antecedents belong to the same clause as only. The weak presupposition and its
partial negation are derived by structure sharing.
The other mirative particles become easier with the machinery of this paper.
(45) Bill is still in Paris.
weak(Lebp,e< t) : Pbt
Bill is weakly presupposed to have left Paris before the time of utterance and asserted to
be there nonetheless. His being in Paris at a moment of time before his supposed leaving
is a lexical presupposition of ”leave” and not indicated.
Bill is weakly presupposed to have left Paris before the time of utterance and
is asserted to be there nonetheless. His being in Paris at a moment of time before his
supposed leaving is a lexical presupposition of leave and not indicated. The fact that
this presupposition is not weak can be accounted for by making it a part of the lexical
specification of still, as proposed by Loebner (1989), Krifka (2000) a.o.
Another option is the hypothesis that lexical presuppositions of weak presuppo-
sitions are projected as normal presuppositions of the trigger of the weak presupposition.
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Within the system of developing presuppositions in auxiliary DRSs at the site of the trig-
ger that is adopted in van der Sandt (1992), the development of a lexical presupposition
of the weak presupposition generated by an occurrence of still takes place at the same
position as the development of the weak presupposition. Resolution or accommodation
of the lexical presupposition of leave would then have to take place before the treatment
of the weak trigger and be confined to the accessibility path of still. In (45) this places
the information that Bill is in Paris at the time of his weakly presupposed departure in
the main DRS.
Notice that in the second option, the ideal of analysing (42) as the conjunction
of mirativity and the semantics of the host can be maintained. This is a good reason for
adopting this second option. In (46), the first formula, would reduce to the second.
(46) weak(at(t ′e),Pbt ′ : Lebp,e< t) : Pbt
at(t ′e),Pbt ′,weak(Lebp,e< t) : Pbt
(47) Bill is already in Paris.
weak(e : Abp,e> t) : Pbt
Bill is weakly presupposed to arrive in Paris after the moment of speaking, but is there
nonetheless. His not being in Paris before the supposed arrival is a lexical presupposi-
tion of arrive and not indicated here. The same remark as above applies to this lexical
presupposition.
(48) Even Bill is in Paris.
weak(Px,¬Pb) : Pb
Bill is in Paris while being weakly presupposed to be not there unlike others. It remains
to be seen to what extent the usual analysis in terms of scales can indeed be avoided in
this way.
These three are simpler than only, since all that the particle does is add a weak
presupposition to the statement, a weak presupposition that conflicts with the statement
itself. They therefore conform to the ideal particle semantics where the particle makes
an independent addition to the semantics of the host. In the case of ”only” that does not
apply, because the statement itself is not a correction of the weak presupposition it con-
flicts with (the statement follows from the weak presupposition), though its exhaustive
interpretation is. The fact that ”only” disambiguates its host makes its semantics seem
to fall short of the ideal particle semantics where the particle just adds another conjunct.
The conclusions of this paper can be listed as follows.
1. Mirativity is best analysed as denying a weak presupposition. This makes the
mirative particles very similar to adversative particles, different only in the fact that
where adversative particles weakly presuppose the falsity of the host, the mirative
particles in addition presuppose a different value for some entity determined by
the host: a moment of time, an object or a quantity.
2. Only expresses low quantity mirativity and thereby imposes an exhaustive inter-
pretation on its host with respect to the definition of the relevant quantity.
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3. In the case of only if, the quantity question becomes under which circumstances
p?. This imposes an existential reading on the conditional and makes only a marker
of the existential reading of the conditional.
4. The status of the host (the prejacent) in only-sentences is that of a “given presuppo-
sition”. It is always weakly presupposed, but not necessarily part of the common
ground yet. If it is not, it will be accommodated at a position determined by the
weak presupposition. This status comes about by the mirative weak presupposi-
tion that makes the host weakly presupposed and makes it impossible to interpret
the host as giving new information. In this respect, it is like a confirmation. Given
presuppositions are not presuppositions, weak presuppositions, implicatures or as-
sertions and one of the two sources of confusion about only is that researchers have
tried to choose between assertion, presupposition and implicature.
5. The other source of confusion is the very close relationship between the denial of
part of the weak presupposition and exhaustivity. Exhaustivity entails the partial
denial of the weak presupposition, but it is stronger, even though, when the weak
presupposition is sufficiently vague (e.g. John and others) its denial can amount
to exhaustivity. It would seem that the possible implicature that the weak presup-
position is true in the case of negative only-sentences is important and cannot be
reduced to exhaustivity.
6. Presuppositions of weak presuppositions are normal presuppositions. This would
appear to be a consequence of the assumptions made in Gazdar (1978) and van der
Sandt (1992) and solves the technical problem of capturing the presupposition of
still p and already p (p was the case until its weakly presupposed end, p was false
until its weakly presupposed start) in a natural way. The lexical specification of
still and already becomes much simpler.
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